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I. INTRODUCTION
Improper disposal of toxic substances and hazardous wastes'
1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (CERCLA or "Superfund"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 &
Supp. 1987), defines hazardous substances broadly by reference to the definition
of the term in other environmental statutes, including the Solid Waste Disposal
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982 & Supp. 1987), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982
& Supp. 1987). CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). CERCLA specifically excludes
"petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise
(163)
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has created a monumental problem for society. 2 In response to
the problem the Federal government passed the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA) s which created a "cradle to
grave" system of regulation for hazardous waste.4 RCRA did not
address the problem of threats associated with abandoned haz-
ardous waste disposal sites. To address this issue, Congress
passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or "Superfund"). 5
Many hazardous waste sites do not qualify for cleanup under
CERCLA6 because they still pose a substantial threat to the pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare. To fill in the gaps left by CERCLA,
numerous states have enacted state hazardous waste cleanup stat-
utes. 7 Furthermore, CERCLA provides states with numerous op-
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance" under the other sub-
sections of section 101(14). Id.
2. It has been estimated that there may be as many as 10,000 sites requiring
cleanup of hazardous chemicals at a potential cost of as much as $100 billion
over a period of decades. H.R. Rep No. 2431, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 55, (1985),
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2837.
3. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6991(i) (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
4. For a general description of the RCRA regulatory program, see J.
QUARLES, FEDERAL REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTES (1982).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 Supp. 1987) (CERCLA was amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1617 (1986)). This article will refer to CERCLA as amended
by SARA.
6. See, e.g., The Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, 35 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6020.102(8) (Purdon Supp. 1989). Section 102(8) provides the
following declaration of policy:
Many of the hazardous sites in this Commonwealth which do not qual-
ify for cleanup under the Federal Supeffund Act pose a substantial
threat to the public health and environment. Therefore, an independ-
ent site cleanup program is necessary to promptly and comprehensively
address the problem of hazardous waste in this Commonwealth,
whether or not these sites qualify for cleanup under the Federal
Superfund Act.
Id.
7. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 25,330 (West 1984 & Supp.
1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-451 (West Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN STAT. ch.
111 1/2, § 1022.2 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH-ENVT. CODE ANN.
§ 7-218 (1987); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21A § 10 (West 1981); The Minne-
sota Environmental Response and Liability Act (MERLA), MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 115B.20 (West Supp. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:3 (Supp. 1988);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 li (West Supp. 1989); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAw § 97-b
(McKinney 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.06 (Anderson 1988); Pa. Haz-
ardous Sites Cleanup Act; 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020.901 (Purdon Supp.
1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-204 (1987).
For a list of 39 state superfund statutes, see Note, The Impact of State "Super-
lien" Statutes on Real Estate Transactions, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 297, 297 n. 1
(1986).
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portunities to participate in the federal cleanup program and, in
some areas, mandates state participation." Due to CERCLA's
provisions for state cooperation and requirements for participa-
tion, many states enacted superfund statutes which provide mech-
anisms for state coordination with the federal program as well as
providing a mechanism for cleanup of sites that cannot be in-
cluded in the federal cleanup program.9
The basic purpose and structure of the state and federal stat-
utes are similar, although the specific provisions of the statutes
vary considerably. Each statute identifies the agency responsible
for implementing the statutory scheme,' 0 and then gives that
Initial questions concerning preemption of state superfund programs seem
to have been resolved in favor of permitting state superfunds to exist. In Exxon
Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986), the Supreme Court struck down portions of
the New Jersey state cleanup tax law on the grounds that CERCLA preempted
the state action. Id. at 376. However, section 114(c) of CERCLA was deleted by
SARA, effectively eliminating the preemption issue with a resolution in favor of
the states. See 132 CONG. REC. S14912 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Lautenberg). See also Hayes & Mackerron, Superfund II: A New Mandate, 17
ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1735 (Feb. 13, 1987).
Notably, CERCLA section 114(a)-(b) permits a state to impose additional
liability with respect to releases of hazardous substances within the state but
precludes any person from recovering compensation for removal costs and dam-
ages under both CERCLA and other federal or state laws. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a)-
(b) (1982). Therefore, CERCLA provides for a flexible and cooperative rela-
tionship between federal and state supeffund programs.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d) (1982 & Supp. 1987) (providing for federal-state
cooperative agreements). CERCLA section 104(c)(3) prohibits the President
from providing quick remedial actions unless the State in which the release oc-
curs first enters into a contract or cooperative agreement providing that: (A) the
State will assure all future maintenance; (B) the State will assure the availability
of adequate hazardous waste disposal facilities; and, (C) the State will pay or
assure payment of 10% of the cost of the remedial action. Id. § 9604(c)(3)
(Supp. 1987). Section 104(c)(9) prohibits the President from providing reme-
dial actions for three years after October 17, 1986, unless the State enters a
contract or cooperative agreement assuring the availability of hazardous waste
treatment or disposal facilities that are within the state or are in accordance with
an interstate agreement. Id. § 9604(c)(9). The facilities must have sufficient ca-
pacity to dispose of the hazardous wastes that can reasonably be expected to be
generated within the State for a period of twenty years. Id. The incentives for a
state statute to provide the means for coordination of the federal-state relation-
ship are indeed large.
9. States are also bearing an increasing burden of the environmental
cleanup costs. In 1979 states received 28% of the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) $1.8 billion operating budget but within ten years the states re-
ceived only 18% of a $1.7 billion EPA operating budget. Long, States Bear Grow-
ing Share of Environmental Cleanup Costs, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Sep. 11,
1989 at 19. Funding of state superfunds through taxes is one mechanism that
states have used to help meet increased financial burdens created by the reduc-
tion in federal funds. See id.
10. CERCLA section 104 designates the President as the responsible au-
thority for cleanup actions. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (Supp. 1987). Section 115 au-
thorizes the President to delegate any duties or powers that he is given by the
3
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agency responsibility to identify and establish the priorities for
cleanup of hazardous waste sites. " The agency may then choose
from alternative procedures to ensure that particular sites are cle-
aned up. 12
The preferred method for site cleanup is usually to identify
the responsible parties and encourage (or coerce) them to per-
form the cleanup.' 3 If the responsible parties cannot be readily
identified, are recalcitrant, or the situation presents an emer-
gency,' 4 then the agency is authorized to proceed with the
cleanup using funds from the established Hazardous Substance
Superfund.15 When superfund funds are used for a cleanup, the
agency is empowered to pursue the responsible parties for reim-
bursement of the fund for the response costs.' 6
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9615. See Exec. Order No. 12580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1987-88),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 9615 (Supp. 1987) (delegating powers to Environmental
Protection Agency and other administrative bodies). The states have generally
designated the state Department of Environmental Resources (or its equivalent)
as the administrator of the state program. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6020.301 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
11. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (Supp. 1987) (mandating creation
of National Priority List); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020.502 (Purdon Supp. 1989)
(mandate to publish priority list of sites). The New Jersey Spill Compensation
and Control Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11-23.11z (West 1982 & Supp.
1989), does not provide for the listing of priority sites, but requires response
action for any release of hazardous substances. See id § 58:10-23.11 f(a).
12. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982 & Supp. 1987) (authorizing
President to take response action or allow any responsible party to take response
action); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982 & Supp. 1987) (President authorized
to require Attorney General to obtain relief in appropriate district court); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1If(a) (West Supp. 1989) (agency may, at its discretion,
direct discharger to perform response actions or may undertake response ac-
tions itself); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020.501(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989) (agency
may permit owner/operator of site to perform response actions or may under-
take response actions that agency deems necessary and appropriate).
13. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
14. See, e.g., id.
15. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (a)(1) (Supp. 1987). The Hazardous Sub-
stance Superfund is established by 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (Supp. 1987). See also Bur-
cat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors, and Other
Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L. J. 509, 512 (1986).
16. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1987). Potentially re-
sponsible parties are enumerated in CERCLA section 107(a)(l) - (4). 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(1) - (4). Private parties that incur necessary response costs consistent
with the National Contingency Plan are also authorized to recover those costs
from other responsible parties. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). While CERCLA does not
define response costs many courts have defined the term broadly. See Jones v.
Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (removal and subse-
quent safe disposal costs); Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Reilly Tar & Chemical
Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 218 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (monitoring, assessing
and evaluation of release or potential release); New York v. General Elec. Co.,
592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). But see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
4
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The procedures and mechanisms for recapture of fund ex-
penditures vary greatly among the various state and federal stat-
utes. The federal Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA) 17 added a provision to CERCLA providing for the
creation of a lien against the property of responsible parties
where that property was subject of a cleanup action.' The fed-
eral lien is subordinated to the rights of any security interest,
judgment lien, or other property interest that is perfected before
notice of the lien has been filed in the appropriate office within
the state.19 Most states that have enacted superfund statutes have
included some form of lien provision to help ensure the collec-
tion of fund expenditures.20 Some state statutes provide for
"superliens," whereby the lien for the expenses of response ac-
tions is superior even to previously perfected liens.2 1
This article will analyze and compare the simple lien22 and
superlien provisions in the federal and state statutes that assist
the government in collecting response costs. The imposition of
liens on property owned by responsible parties or the property
subject to a cleanup action (if that property is not owned by a
responsible party) can be an effective method of securing the pay-
ment of response costs from the parties that caused the contami-
nation or of ensuring that non-responsible parties do not reap a
windfall after the government has expended money in a cleanup
action. The question that this article will address is whether a
superlien imposes an undue burden upon an arguably non-re-
sponsible party, such as creditor with a valid security interest in
the contaminated property who was neither directly nor indirectly
responsible for the contamination or the truly innocent owner of
Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983) (not investigative costs because they are
different in kind from costs associated with containment of treatment actions).
17. Pub. Law. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (Supp. 1987)). See supra note 5.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (Supp. 1987).
19. Id. § 9607(1)(3).
20. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-7-516 (Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 213 § 13 (West
Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147B:10-b (Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN.
58:10-23.1 f.f (West Supp. 1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020.509 (Purdon
Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-209 (Supp. 1989).
21. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-7-516 (Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E § 13 (West
Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147B:10-b (Supp. 1988); NJ. STAT. ANN.
58:10-23.11 f.f (West Supp. 1989).
22. For the sake of clarity, this article will refer to nonsuperliens generically
as simple liens.
1990]
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contaminated land. The financial interests of the parties involved
must be understood before an assessment can be made as to
whether a superlien allocates response costs in an appropriate
manner.
This article will then address the allocation of response costs
under the statutory framework of the federal and various state
superfund laws, with particular emphasis on the definitions of re-
sponsible party. Finally, the article will identify other political
and economic considerations that affect the appropriateness of
lien and superlien provisions for allocating the costs of environ-
mental decontamination.
II. STATUTES
The impact of various lien provisions is determined by the
definition of "responsible party." The relationship between the
provisions of various statutes, which define "responsible party",
will demonstrate how costs are allocated among various inter-
ested parties.
A. CERCLA
The 1986 amendments to CERCLA included a provision pro-
viding that all costs and damages to which a person is liable under
the act shall constitute a lien in favor of the federal government. 23
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l) (Supp. 1987). Section 107(1) provides:
(1) In General
All costs and damages for which a person is liable to the United
States under subsection (a) of this section (other than the owner or op-
erator of a vessel under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this section)
shall constitute a lien in favor of the United States upon all real prop-
erty and rights to such property which-
(A) belong to such person; and
(B) are subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action.
(2) Duration
The lien imposed by this subsection shall arise at the later of the
following:
(A) The time costs are first incurred by the United States with re-
spect to a response action under this chapter.
(B) The time that the person referred to in paragraph (1) is pro-
vided (by certified or registered mail) written notice of poten-
tial liability.
Such lien shall continue until the liability for the costs (or a judgment
against the person arising out of such liability) is satisfied or becomes
unenforceable through operation of the statute of limitations provided
in section 9613 of this title.
(3) Notice and Validity
The lien imposed by this subsection shall be subject to the rights of
any purchaser, holder of a security interest, or judgment lien creditor
whose interest is perfected under applicable State law before notice of
6
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The lien is imposed on "all real property and rights to such prop-
erty" which: 1) belong to a responsible party; and, 2) is the sub-
ject of the cleanup activities.2 4 While the lien does not take
priority over mortgagees or other secured creditors who have
perfected their interest under state law, it will take priority over
liens filed subsequent to the federal lien.2 5
However, the CERCLA lien is contingent on the liability of
the lien has been filed in the appropriate office within the State ... as
designated by State law, in which the real property... is located. Any
such purchaser, holder of a security interest, or judgment lien creditor
shall be afforded the same protections against the lien imposed by this
subsection as are afforded under State law against a judgment lien
which arises out of an unsecured obligation and which arises as of the
time of the filing of the notice of the lien imposed by this subsection.
Id.
24. Id. It is unclear what the phrase "and rights to such property" in sec-
tion 107(1)(1) is intended to cover. CERCLA liability has been imposed on op-
erators as well as owners (see infra notes 26-45 and accompanying text for a
discussion of liability). Operators that are not owners may have some interest in
the land such as a lease. In other cases, creditors have been held to be poten-
tially liable as a result of either foreclosure on contaminated properties (see
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986)),
or due to involvement in day-to-day operations, (see United States v. Mirabile, 15
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985)). It seems possible that
liens could be used to encumber interests other than ownership if the phrase is
read broadly by the courts. For example, if a bank with a mortgage on contami-
nated property was held to be a responsible party, then the bank's rights under
the mortgage might be encumbered by the CERCLA lien.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)(3) (Supp. 1987). Congress specifically considered
the needs of "commercial interests" in deciding not to make the lien provision
take priority over existing interests. See H.R. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3, 17-
18, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3038, 3040-4 1. In further
consideration of commercial interests, the lien will only be effective against
other interests when filed in accordance with state law so that a title search of the
affected property will notify other potential creditors of the existence of the lien.
Id.
7
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the party.26 CERCLA liability is strict, joint, and several.2 7 One
exception to liability is established by section 101 (20)(A). 2 8 This
section narrows the definition of "owner of operator" by exclud-
ing a party who does not "participate in the management or oper-
ation of a... facility [and] holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest." 29  Notwithstanding section
101(20)(A), courts have broadly interpreted the definition of re-
sponsible parties under CERCLA.30 Landowners and other par-
ties that were not responsible for the creation of hazardous waste
have been included in the universe of responsible parties. 3'
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1987). CERCLA imposes liability for re-
moval and remedial costs and any other necessary response costs at a facility
from which there has been a release or threatened release upon the following:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person ....
Id. See generally Glass, The Modern Snake in the Grass: An Examination of Real Estate
& Commercial Liability Under Superfund & SARA and Suggested Guidelines for the Practi-
tioner, 14 B.C. ENvrL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 381 (1987).
27. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D.
Ohio 1983). The Chem-Dyne standard of liability is cited with approval in the
legislative history of the 1986 amendments to CERCLA. See H.R. 253, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 74, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2835, 2856. See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1985); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. 1987). Three other affirmative de-
fenses to liability may be asserted where the release or threatened release results
solely from: 1) an act of God; 2) an act of war; or, 3) an act or omission of a
.third party," not an agent of the landowner, where that act or omission does
not occur in connection with a contractual relation with the landowner. Id.
§ 9607(b). The "third party" defense is often referred to as the "innocent land-
owner" defense. For a detailed discussion of the innocent landowner defense,
see Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and the Reauthorization
Act on the Commercial Lending Industry: A Critical Analysis, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 879
(1987) [hereinafter Superfund Amendments of 1986]; Comment, The Hazardous
Waste Abatement Liability of Innocent Landowners: A Constitutional Analysis, 17 PAc L.J.
185, 190 (1985).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. 1987). See Superfund Amendments of
1986, supra note 28, at 886, n. 33.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1987). See generally Superfund Amendments of
1986, supra note 28.
31. See Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d
8
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Under the rationale of these cases, a creditor may be held liable as
a responsible party if that creditor participates in the day-to-day
business operations of the debtor, exercises control over, or
maintains ownership of the property for a significant period of
time.32
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 3 3 a bank which
acquired a property at a foreclosure sale was held strictly liable
for cleanup costs.3 4 In Maryland Bank, the bank maintained own-
ership of the property for a period of over one and one-half years
after foreclosure and before the cleanup action.35 The court held
that a party did not have to be both an owner and an operator to
be subject to liability for response costs under CERCLA section
107.36 Instead, mere ownership was sufficient to subject the bank
to liability.3 7 The security interest exception was inapplicable be-
cause Maryland Bank was the owner at the time of the cleanup,
not merely the holder of a security interest.3 8
United States v. Mirabile39 presents a second interesting excep-
tion to section 101(20) (A). The American Bank and Trust Com-
pany (ABT) foreclosed on a property and bought the property at
the sheriff's sale, but before actually acquiring title ABT pro-
ceeded to assign their interest in the property to Anna and
Thomas Mirabile.40 Without resolving whether ABT's successful
1568 (5th Cir. 1988) (lender and developer involved with development of con-
taminated property denied motion to dismiss); New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (owner of land contaminated by prior owner held
strictly liable for government cleanup costs); United States v. Maryland Bank
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (bank holding mortgage held liable
after purchasing property at foreclosure sale).
32. Note that the language in the CERCLA lien covers all real property and
"rights to such property." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (Supp. 1987). Perhaps the CER-
CLA lien could be used to encumber a mortgagor's interest in the property
where, as in the case of Mellon Bank, the mortgagor was held to be liable as an
operator. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
33. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
34. Id. at 582.
35. Id. at 575.
36. Id. at 577.
37. Id. at 578.
38. Id. at 579. While Maryland Bank owned the property for a significant
period of time before the cleanup, liability premised on ownership may occur
from holding title for as little as one hour. See United States v. Carolawn Co., 14
ENvr-.. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699 (D.S.C. 1984) (summary judgment denied
for defendant that held title for approximately one hour). While the security
interest exemption may provide some protection for foreclosing creditors, once
a creditor takes title to contaminated property liability for response actions is a
possibility no matter how quickly the creditor disposes of the property.
39. 15 ENvr. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
40. Id. at 20,996.
1990]
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bid at the foreclosure sale vested equitable title in the bank, the
court ruled that ABT fell within the purview of section
101(20)(A) 41 as the bank only held a property interest to protect
its security interest.42 However, Mellon Bank (East), another
creditor of the company responsible for creation of the wastes,
had apparently participated in the day-to-day operations of the
business. 43 Without knowing the specific extent of Mellon's in-
volvement, the court was unwilling to grant summary judgment in
Mellon's favor.44
Considering that CERCLA liability is joint and several, being
a responsible party could potentially subject a creditor to liability
for the total cleanup costs. 45 The cleanup costs could greatly ex-
ceed the amount of the initial security interest that a creditor had
in a property. Accordingly, under certain circumstances, lenders
with security interests in contaminated property stand to lose
even more than the value of their initial investments not to men-
tion their collateral.
B. STATE LIEN STATUTES
1. Simple Liens
Simple lien statutes, of various types, exist in several states. 46
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. 1989).
42. 15 EmvwL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996. It should be noted that
ABT also took steps to secure the property during the interval between the sher-
iff's sale and the assignment to the Mirabiles. Id.
43. Id. at 20,997.
44. Id. Creditor liability in control situations is not a new concept. For a
discussion of the history of control relationship liability, see Pennbank v. Pa.
Dept. Envtl. Resources, No. 88-281-M, Envtl. Hearing Board, 1989 W.L. 75,391
(Feb 15. 1989). For a discussion of standards of liability under CERCLA for
creditors in control situations, see Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Manage-
ment Particpation Under Section 10](20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925 (1989)
(recommending common law standards while avoiding discouraging lenders
from "deterring reckless disposal practices").
See also United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga.
1988) (denial of summary judgment in favor of creditor that allegedly controlled
company after closure and during liquidation of assets.).
45. A recent case can be interpreted as extending the possibilities of liabil-
ity. In Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., No. 86-2093, 30 ENV'T REP.
CAS. (BNA) 1665 (W.D. Pa. 1989), the federal district court denied summary
judgment to a bank that foreclosed on industrial property later found to be con-
taminated. Id. The court held that the "security interest" exception was inappli-
cable when a lender purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Id. However,
the foreclosing bank exercised significant control over the operation of the
property. Accordingly, the holding in this case is not surprising and does not
necessarily indicate a significant leap in the imposition of CERCLA liability.
46. See, e.g., Pa. Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 6020.101 - 6020.1305 (Purdon Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-201 -
10
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Provisions of selected state lien statutes (both simple liens and
superliens) are summarized in Table I. Many state statutes follow
the federal model by giving simple liens priority, as of the date of
filing, to real estate which is not subject to remedial actions and to
personal property owned by responsible parties. The Penn-
sylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act 47 provisions permit imposi-
tion of a lien on the contaminated property, if owned by a
responsible party, as well as on all other real property, personal
property and revenues of the responsible parties.4 8 The Penn-
sylvania lien will not take priority over "any valid lien, right or
interest in the property filed in accordance with established pro-
cedure prior to the filing of a notice of lien under this
subsection." 49
Unlike the Pennsylvania lien, the Tennessee lien operates
without regard to owner responsibility. 50 The Tennessee lien is
imposed for costs incurred by the commissioner for investigation,
222 (1987 and Supp. 1989). While other states have also passed similar statutes
this paper will limit its analysis to Pennsylvania and Tennessee.
47. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6020.101 - 6020.1305 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
48. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020.509. Section 6020.509 provides:
An award of response costs, assessment of damages to natural re-
sources or assessment of civil penalties shall constitute a judgment
against the responsible person .... The department shall send a notice
of lien to the prothonotary or equivalent official of the county in which
the responsible person has real or personal property, setting forth the
amount of the award of costs .... Upon entry by the prothonotary, the
lien shall attach to all real.., and personal property of the responsible
person, whether or not the responsible party is insolvent.
Id.
49. Id. § 6020.509(c).
50. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-209(a)-(b) (Supp. 1989). The provision pro-
vides that:
(a) Whenever a hazardous substance site is placed on the list of
hazardous substance sites ... or whenever the commissioner otherwise
begins to expend money for investigation, identification, containment
or clean up of a particular site under this part, the commissioner may
file a notice with the office of the register of deeds of the county in
which the property lies.
(b) Within one (1) year after completion of a project to contain or
clean up the hazardous substance at a particular site under this part, the
commissioner shall itemize the money so expended and shall file a
statement thereof . . . together with notarized appraisals by an in-
dependent appraiser of the value of the property before and after the
clean up work performed at the site, if the money so expended shall
result in a significant increase in property values. Such statement shall
constitute a lien upon such land. The lien shall not exceed the amount
determined by the appraisal to be the increase in the market value of
the property as a result of the cleanup work.
1990]
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identification, containment, or cleanup of a particular site.5 1
However, the Tennessee lien attaches only to the property that is
subject to the remedial actions and is limited to the amount of
increased property value resulting from the state cleanup. 52 The
Pennsylvania lien covers all of the liabilities to the state, including
response costs, assessments of damages to natural resources, and
civil penalties. The lien attaches to all revenues and real and per-
sonal property of the responsible party. 53
The Pennsylvania statute provides exceptions to owner liabil-
ity, hence, exceptions to the lien provisions since the lien is
premised on the landowner being a responsible party. The Penn-
sylvania act establishes an innocent landowner defense similar to
the federal provision; however, the Pennsylvania provision that
provides additional protection for lenders.54 A financial institu-
tion (or its affiliate) is excluded from the definition of "owner"
provided the institution does not have knowledge that the site has
been listed on the National Priority List or some corresponding
state list 5 5 and does not contribute to release.5 6 The state's inno-
51. Id. § 209(a).
52. Id. § 209(a)-(b) This approach has some inherent problems, such as
how the increased value will be measured. The statute provides for an in-
dependent appraisal, but if the property owner is aggrieved by the amount of
the lien (i.e. the increased value) then the owner can have an independent ap-
praisal and submit the matter to the chancery court for determination of the
appropriate amount of the lien. Id § 209(c). This will certainly create a new
field of superftind related litigation.
53. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 6020.509(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
54. Id. § 6020.701(b)(1).
55. For a discussion of the listing of hazardous waste sites, see supra note 11
and accompanying text.
56. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020.103 (Purdon Supp. 1989). Section
6020.103 provides:
"Owner or operator." A person who owns or operates or has owned or
operated a site, or otherwise controlled activities at a site. The term
does not include a person who, without participating in management of
a site, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest
in the site nor a unit of State or local government which acquired own-
ership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency,
abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government invol-
untarily acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign. The term
also shall not include afinancial institution, an affiliate of a financial institu-
tion, a parent of a financial institution, nor a corporate instrumentality
of the Federal Government, which acquired the site by foreclosure or by deed in
lieu offoreclosure as a result of the enforcement of a mortgage or security
interest held by such financial institution . ... before it had knowledge
that the site was included on the National Priority List or correspond-
ing State list and did not manage or control activities at the site which
contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stances. For the purposes of this subsection, the term "management"
shall not include participation in or supervising the finances or fiscal
12
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cent landowner defense provides that an owner will not be liable
if: 1) the site was acquired after disposal; 2) the owner exercised
due care; 3) the owner took precautions against foreseeable acts
of omissions of others; 4) the owner obtained actual knowledge of
the release during ownership and did not subsequently transfer
the property without disclosing such knowledge; 5) the owner has
not contributed to the release; and, 6) either: A) the owner is a
financial institution which acquired the site through foreclosure
or deed in lieu thereof; or, B) at the time of acquisition the owner
did not know or have reason to know of the hazardous substance,
and the owner made all appropriate inquiries consistent with
good commercial practices taking into account factors including
purchase price and specialized knowledge. 57 The Pennsylvania
provisions protect lenders from being held liable under the cir-
cumstances that lenders were held to be potentially responsible
parties under CERCLA. 58
The Pennsylvania statute also provides that liability, and
hence the lien provision, shall not apply to the owners of "real
property if the real property is exclusively used as single or multi-
family housing of four units or less or for private non-commercial
recreational purposes," provided that the owner did not place the
hazardous substance on the property. 59 The Tennessee statute
does not provide for an exception for either lenders or residential
real estate.
The Pennsylvania and the Tennessee statutes also differ with
respect to when the liens can be filed. Under the Tennessee stat-
utes "[w]henever a hazardous substance site is placed on the list
of hazardous substance sites .. .or whenever the commissioner
otherwise begins to expend money.., the commissioner may file
a notice with the office of the register of deeds." 6° Within one
year of completion of a project the commissioner must file an
operations of a responsible person or an owner or operator in connec-
tion with a loan to, services provided for or fiscal obligation of that
responsible person or owner or operator or actions taken to protect or
preserve the value of the site or operations conducted on the site.
Id. (emphasis added).
57. See id. § 6020.701(b)(1)(i) - (vi). The innocent landowner defense also
provides special protection to government entities acquiring property through
escheat and owners acquiring property through inheritance. Id
58. For a discussion of lender liability under CERCLA, see supra notes 26-
45 and accompanying text.
59. PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6020.701(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1989). This ex-
ception is also repeated in the Defenses to Liability section. Id. § 6020.703(d).
60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-209(a) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
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itemized report of the money expended at a site with the register
of deeds. 6' In Pennsylvania, the lien does not come into exist-
ence until an award of response costs or an assessment of dam-
ages has been made and, at that point, the notice of lien must be
filed. 6 2 The Tennessee provision is laudable in that the lien may
be filed early in the remedial process. In contrast, the Penn-
sylvania provision seems to provide for the filing of the lien at the
latest possible stage of the process: following the clean up and
after any litigation concerning responsibility. The Pennsylvania
statute does provide for a central registry for all liens filed pursu-
ant to the statute. 63 The registry could be an extremely useful
tool for the purchasers of real estate and commercial lenders as
they research the environmental status of a given piece of
property.
61. Id. § 209(b).
62. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 6020.509(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989). The notice of
lien must include the amount of the award and of the assessed damages and
penalties. Id.
63. Id. § 6020.509(c).
14
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SUMMARY OF LIEN PROVISIONS IN SELECTED STATE
SUPERFUND STATUTES (TABLE I)
Conn. Tenn. N.|. Pa. Mass. N.H. Ark. CERCLA
Superlien on restored property:
Responsible Owner X
6 4  X6 5  X 6 6 X
Innocent Owner X
Lien:
Restored Property X6 7  X X
6 8
Other Real Property X X X X X
Personal Property X X X X
Revenues X6 9 X X X
Exceptions:
Residential X X X
Time X
Creditor X
Other X 7 0  X
7 1
Lien for:
All damages X
Money Expended X X 7 2  X X X
Filing of Lien:
Listing of site X
Expenditure of Money X X X
Date Debt Due X X
Notice X X 7 3  X X X 7 4 X X
64. The lien affects the "property of the discharger." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:10-23.1 If.f (West Supp. 1988). Accordingly, the lien seems to depend upon
whether the owner of the restored property was responsible.
65. Superlien also applies to all personal property, tangible or intangible,
located at the restored facility. MASs. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 21E § 13 (West Supp.
1989).
66. Superlien also applies to all business revenues generated and all
personal property located at the restored facility. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-
B:10b Ill(b) (Supp. 1988).
67. Lien is only effective against the increase in property value resulting
from the cleanup. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-209(b) (Supp. 1989). It should be
noted that the Tennessee statute was amended in 1988 repealing a superlien
provision and replacing it with a simple lien provision. See TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 68-46-209(d) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
68. The lien is effective only if the property is owned by a responsible party.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (Supp. 1987).
69. Considering that lien affects "all property of the discharger," N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 58:10-23.1 f.f (West Supp. 1989), it seems likely that this could be
interpreted to include revenues.
70. Property transferred pursuant to sections 22a-134 to 22a-134d is
exempted from priority liens. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a(a) (West
Supp. 1989). Sections 22a-134 to 22a-134d provide for transfers of established
facilities which handle hazardous waste.
71. The lien does not take priority over real estate tax liens. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 8-7-516(b) (Supp. 1989).
72. The lien shall be for the money expended but shall not exceed the
amount of increased value resulting from the cleanup. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-
46-209(b) (Supp. 1989).
73. Within one year after completing the project the expenditures made
must be itemized and filed with the register of deeds. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-
209(b) (Supp. 1989).
74. Apparently, the lien is effective as soon as the debt to the state is due.
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2. Superliens
Superlien provisions, 75 imposed on real estate and other
property, serve to ensure reimbursement for costs incurred as a
result of cleanup operations. 76 Ensuring reimbursement of gov-
ernment expenditures is designed to ensure sufficient funds for
quick and effective response to future releases at sites and pro-
vides motivation for purchasers of real property and their lenders
to be more cautious about their investments. 77
State superlien provisions can be categorized into several
genres. The most extreme superlien provision would provide for
a superlien on all real and personal property, including revenues,
of the responsible parties and on the restored property, even if
the property was owned by an innocent landowner. No superlien
provisions of this severity exist at present. 78 Superlien provisions
currently in effect impose the superlien only on the affected prop-
erty. Two basic variations exist: 1) the superlien will be imposed
on the restored land, regardless of the responsibility of the
owner,79 or 2) the superlien is only effective on the restored prop-
The superlien, however, does not take priority until it has been duly filed. MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21E § 13 (West Supp. 1989).
75. Priority liens are generally referred to as "superliens". See Schwenke &
Lockett, Superlien "Solutions" to Hazardous Waste: Bankruptcy Conflicts, ENV'T L.
(ABA) 1,2 (Winter 83/84).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 2-3. In connection with ensuring government funds for future
cleanups, the superliens provide for preferential treatment of the governments
claims in the event that the responsible party seeks protection in bankruptcy.
For a discussion of the effect of superliens in bankruptcy, see infra notes 95-103
and accompanying text.
78. Prior to amendment in 1985, section 1 (f) of the New Jersey Spill Com-
pensation and Control Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 lf.f (West 1982), pro-
vided for such draconien liens. The provision read: "Any expenditures made by
the administrator pursuant to this act shall constitute afirst priority claim and lien
paramount to all other claims and liens upon the revenues and all real and personal
property of the discharger .... Id. (emphasis added).
79. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1989) which
provides:
(a) On and afterJune 3, 1985, any amount paid by the commissioner of
environmental protection pursuant to subsection (b) of section 22a-451
to contain and remove or mitigate the effects of a spill shall be a lien
against the real estate on which the spill occurred or from which it ema-
nated in accordance with the provisions of this section, except that such
lien against real estate which has been transferred in accordance with
the provisions of sections 22a-134 to -134d, inclusive, shall not have
priority over any previous transfer or encumbrance. ...
(c) Except as provided in subsection (a), such lien shall take prece-
dence over all transfers and encumbrances recorded on or afterJune 3,
1985, in any manner affecting such interest in such real estate or any
part of it on which the spill occurred or from which the spill emanated,
16
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erty if the owner is a responsible party.8 0
or real estate which has been included, within the preceding three
years, in the property description of such real estate and is contiguous
to such real estate. This subsection shall not apply to real estate which
consists exclusively of residential real estate, including but not limited
to, residential units in any common interest community, as defined in
section 47-202.
Id
The Connecticut statute is unique in that the superlien only applies for se-
curity interests perfected after the effective date of the Act. The Connecticut
statute also precludes a superlien if real estate has been transferred in accord-
ance with provisions requiring a transferor of an establishment handling hazard-
ous waste to give a negative declaration of contamination or a certificate of
cleanup. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-134 to -134d (West Supp. 1989).
80. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f.f (West Supp. 1989) which
provides:The notice of lien filed pursuant to this subsection which affects
the property of a discharger subject to the cleanup and removal of a
discharge shall create a lien with priority over all other claims or liens
which are or have been filed against the property, except if the property
comprises six dwelling units or less and is used exclusively for residen-
tial purposes, this notice of lien shall not affect any valid lien, right or
interest in the property filed in accordance with established procedure
prior to the filing of this notice of lien. The notice of lien filed pursuant
to this subsection which affects any property of a discharger other than
the property subject to the cleanup and removal, shall have priority
from the day of the filing of the notice the lien [sic] over all other claims
and liens filed against the property, but shall not affect any valid lien,
right or interest in the property filed in accordance with established
procedure prior to the filing of a notice of lien pursuant to this
subsection.
Id.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (Supp. 1989) which provides:
I. The division of waste management shall have a lien upon the busi-
ness revenues and all real and personal property of any person subject
to liability under RSA 147-B:10, for all costs incurred by the state pur-
suant to RSA 147-B:10, II....
III. The priority of the lien created by this section shall be as follows:
(a) As to the real property on which the hazardous waste or haz-
ardous material is located, the lien shall constitute a first priority lien
against such real property prior to all encumbrances, whether of record
of inchoate, when notice of lien is recorded....
(b) As to the business revenues generated from the facility on
which hazardous waste or hazardous material is located and personal
property located at the facility on which hazardous waste or hazardous
material is located, the lien shall constitute a first priority lien against
such business revenues or personal property, prior to all encum-
brances, whether of record or inchoate....
(c) As to all other property, whether real, personal or business rev-
enues, other than that which is described in subparagraph (a) or (b) of
this paragraph, the notice of lien shall constitute a lien that is effective
as of the date and time of recording or filing, without priority on ante-
cedent encumbrances of record. ...
Id.
See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-7-516 (Supp. 1989) (Arkansas statute does not
impose lien on property other than site of remedial action); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 21E § 13 (West Supp. 1989).
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Some differences exist between the superlien provisions.
Many contain exceptions for residential real estate."s Others, like
the Connecticut statute, provide for superliens only over other
liens which were perfected after the effective date of the Act.8 2 In
contrast the New Hampshire provisions are particularly sweeping,
providing for a superior lien not only on the restored real estate
(if owned by a responsible party), but also on all personal prop-
erty located at and all revenues generated at the site of the re-
sponse action.8 3
The superlien statutes also differ with respect to what costs
can be included in the lien. Most of the provisions provide for
liens only for the amount of money expended in the cleanup and
related activities such as investigation and feasibility studies. s 4
The Massachusetts provision, however, provides for a superlien
covering all debts due to the state which would include damage to
natural resources as well as fund expenditures.8 5
Virtually all lien statues (either superlien or simple lien) re-
quire recordation of the lien before it can become effective.8 6
Generally, the statutes are vague on when notice of the lien
should be filed. Possible interpretations of when a notice may be
filed include: 1) As soon as the state anticipates expending
money; 2) As soon as some money has been expended; or, 3) not
until the cleanup has been completed and a sum-certain has been
81. See, e.g., CONN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a(c) (West Supp. 1989); MASS GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 21E § 13 (West Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1If.f
(West Supp. 1989). But see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-7-516 (Supp. 1989); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (Supp. 1988).
82. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a(c) (West Supp. 1989) ("such lien
shall take precedence over all transfers and encumbrances recorded on or after
June 3, 1985").
83. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147B:10-b III (Supp. 1988).
84. See ARK STAT. ANN. § 8-7-516(a) (Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22a-452a(a) (West Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-bI to II
(Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 f.f (West Supp. 1989).
85. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21E § 13 (West Supp. 1989). The Massachu-
setts lien also includes 12% interest from the date the debt becomes due. Id.
86. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 lf.f (West Supp 1989):
Any expenditures made by the administrator pursuant to this act shall
constitute in each instance, a debt of the discharger to the fund. The
debt shall constitute a lien on all property owned by the discharger
when a notice of lien, incorporating a description of the property of the
discharger subject to the cleanup and removal and an identification of
the amount of cleanup, removal and related costs expended from the
fund is duly filed with the clerk of the Superior Court.
Id.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-7-516 (Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 21E § 13
(West Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b II (Supp. 1988).
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expended. One problem evident with most of the statutes is that
expenses will be incurred over time and the administrator will
either have to wait until all expenditures are made before filing
notice with a definitive value or file notice several times, as the
funds are expended. Any delay in the filing of the lien will create
problems for the purchasers of real estate.8 7
Analysis of the definition of responsible (or liable) party in
conjunction with the lien provision is important to completely un-
derstand how a given statute will allocate costs among specific in-
terested parties. Some of the superlien statues exempt creditors
from being held liable for the costs of cleanup beyond the value
of the property. 88 However, many of the superlien statutes have
no creditor exemption.8 9 Presumably, without any additional
protection creditors will be exposed to direct liability as owners
and operators as has occurred under the federal superfund stat-
ute.90 The Massachusetts provision provides an interesting alter-
native from completely exempting creditors by limiting the
liability for "innocent" owners to the value of the remediated
property. 9' This provision would assist creditors that had fore-
87. Cf Simon v. Oldmans, 203 N.J. Super. 365, 497 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super.
Ch. Div. 1985) (action for rescission of tax receipts sale due to alleged non-
disclosure of known environmental contamination). See also Note, The Impact of
State "Superlien " Statutes on Real Estate Transactions, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L.
297, 319 (1986) (recommending that superliens not attach until properly
recorded).
The NewJersey statue provides that "any expenditure made by the adminis-
trator . . . shall constitute a lien ...... N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 lf.f (West
Supp. 1989). The total expenditures will not be known until the project is com-
pleted. If the Administrator delays filing of any liens, particularly the simple
liens on non-contaminated property, dischargers may be encouraged to divest
assets before the liens are filed.
88. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452b which provides:
Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, a mortgagee
who acquires title to real estate by virtue of a foreclosure or tender of a
deed in lieu of foreclosure shall not be liable for any assessment, fine or
other costs imposed by the state for any spill upon such real estate be-
yond the value of such real estate, provided such spill occurred prior to
the date of acquisition of such real estate by such mortgagee.
Id.
89. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-7-512 (Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 147-B:10 (Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 g.b-d (West Supp.
1982).
90. For a discussion of creditor liability under CERCLA, see supra notes 26-
45 and accompanying text.
91. The Massachusetts innocent landowner defense is similar to the federal
provision and provides that liability will not exist if the landowner can show that
the contamination was caused by:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
1990]
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closed on property92 by limiting their liability to the value of the
property. Creditors found to be liable as operators due to in-
volvement in the day-to-day business operations of their debt-
ors93 will not be protected by this provision.
C. BANKRUPTCY
The federal Bankruptcy Act 94 is structured to provide fair
and orderly distribution of a debtor's assets among the creditors,
while permitting the debtor to have a fresh start or to reorganize
and preserve going concern value.95 Secured creditors obtain
preferred treatment under the Bankruptcy Act. 96 In Ohio v. Ko-
vacs97 the Supreme Court ruled that a state court injunction, re-
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the person, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship existing directly or indirectly, with the
person, except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a
published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by
rail, if the person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
he exercised due care with respect to the oil or hazardous material, that
he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any third
party and the consequences that could foresecably result from such acts
of omissions, and that he compiled with all notification
requirements....
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21E § 5(c) (West Supp. 1989). The limitation of lia-
bility provides that:
Any person whose land has been the site of a release of hazardous ma-
terial for which the department has incurred costs for assessment, con-
tainment and removal.., and who can establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that he is otherwise eligible for the defenses set forth in
paragraph (c) shall be liable to the department for such expenses only
to the extent of the value of the property following the department's
assessment, containment and removal actions.
Id. § 5(a).
92. For discussion of lenders liable as owners after foreclosure, see discus-
sion of United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. supra notes 29-36 and accompa-
nying text.
93. For discussion of lenders liable as operators, see discussion of United
States v. Mirabile supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
94. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
95. See Schwenke & Lockett, supra note 46, at 1.
96. See I I U.S.C. § 506 (1982 & Supp. 1987); Note, Priority Lien Statutes: The
States' Answer to Bankrupt Hazardous Waste Generators, 31 WASH U. J. URBAN AND
CONTEMP. LAw 373, 375 (1987). The article states that, "'secured creditors, in-
cluding those with a valid statutory or judicial lien, bypass the Bankruptcy Act's
main distribution system. [citation omitted]. The lienholder, however, must
make sure that the bankrupt's trustee cannot avoid the lien under any of the
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1982)."
Id. at 375 n. 14.
97. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
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quiring the cleanup of a hazardous waste site, was a "claim" 981 that
was dischargeable in bankruptcy because it had been effectively
reduced to a monetary judgment. 99  However, as Justice
O'Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion, Congress has
generally left the determination of property rights and priorities
in bankruptcy to the state and therefore, classification of Ohio's
interest as either a lien on the property, a perfected security inter-
est, or an unsecured claim depends on Ohio law, thus "a state
may protect its interest in the enforcement of its environmental
laws by giving cleanup judgments the status of a statutory liens or
secured claims."' 00 Accordingly, by creating a lien for cleanup
cost, superfund statutes preclude liable parties from discharging
their liability in bankruptcy.' 0 ' A superlien would provide the
state with preference over other secured creditors. 02
98. For the bankruptcy definition of "claim," see 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(B)
(1982).
99. 469 U.S. at 283. The Bankruptcy Act "exempts actions by goyernmen-
tal units performed pursuant to the police power of the governmental units per-
formed pursuant to the police power of the government, 11 U.S.C.§§ 362(b)(4)-
(5)", from the automatic stay provisions. Penn Terra Ltd v. Dep't of Envtl. Re-
sources, 733 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1984) (post petition injunction not subject
to stay even though compliance would require expenditure of bankruptcy es-
tate). See also A. COHEN, GUIDE TO SECURED LENDING TRANSACTIONS, § 8.01(2)
(1988). Also, fines and monetary penalties are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) (1982). See also Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 274. Accord-
ingly, courts must distinguish between government actions taken to compensate
for past damages to the state and actions taken to insure future compliance or to
penalize. If the state government can establish that the action is not an attempt
to enforce a money judgment, but rather is an attempt to exercise its police
powers, the Bankruptcy Act will not stay proceedings by the state and the obliga-
tions will not be dischargeable. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources,
733 F.2d 267, 272.
100. 469 U.S. at 285-86 (J. O'Connor concurring).
101. The lien would give the state's claim, as determined by the bankruptcy
court, the status of an allowed secured claim at least up to the value of real or
personal property subject to the lien with the balance of the claim being an un-
secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(d) (1982). In states where at least a simple
lien covers all of the property of the debtor, the state would receive all of the
property of the debtor except for the value of property with secured claims prior
to the state's.
For a discussion of other issues relating to bankruptcy, such as the ability of
the trustee to abandon the contaminated property, see Note, Priority Lien Statutes:
The States'Answer to Bankrupt Hazardous Waste Generators, 31 WASH U.J. URBAN AND
CONTEMP. LAw 373 (1987).
102. See Note, Priority Lien Statutes: The States'Answer to Bankrupt Hazardous
Waste Generators, 31 WASH U.J. URBAN AND CONTEMP. LAw 373 (1987). In Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, the assets of the debtor are liquidated for the
benefit of the creditors, in Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings, debtors reor-
ganize and continue their operations and state environmental regulations would
remain enforceable. Id. at 380-81 n. 51.
Under Chapter 11 the debtor is permitted to retain and use property. See A.
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Il1. AFFECTED PARTIES
A. CREDITORS
An ultimate fear for creditors is being held jointly and sever-
ally liable for the response costs at a superfund site. 03 Without
some sort of statutory protection lenders should plan carefully to
avoid liability."°4 But, even if lenders can avoid superfund liabil-
ity once contamination is discovered, the lien provisions create
new risks for prior secured, unsecured, and all subsequent
creditors.
For a secured creditor, lien statues pose risks of loss of the
collateral securing a loan. The greatest potential impact on col-
lateral will be felt in superlien states where the total value of col-
lateral is at risk.10 5 Simple lien provisions will, nonetheless,
impact on secured creditors because they encumber assets of the
responsible party that might otherwise be used to maintain pro-
ductive business operations, and may hasten the filing of bank-
ruptcy claims because it may become impossible to raise more
working capital to sustain operations (or to satisfy superfund
obligations).
Unsecured creditors will also feel the impact of liens for
cleanup liability. Again, the imposition of either a super or a sim-
ple-lien may greatly hinder the ability of a company to continue
operations and therefore lead to default on loans. Unsecured
creditors, who may be less familiar (or completely unfamiliar)
with a debtor's operations, particularly when the operations are
either highly diversified or geographically dispersed, may be un-
pleasantly surprised by the effect of the superfund lien provisions.
Finally, in the event of insolvency, as creditors stand in line for
funds, lien provisions, whether or not they are superliens, will put
the government in line before unsecured creditors.
COHEN, GUIDE TO SECURED LENDING § 8.02 (1988). Lien provisions might be
helpful in ensuring that the state receives repayment of environmental response
costs because debtors in possession may have to provide secured parties "ade-
quate protection" as a condition for using the property. II U.S.C. § 363(e)
(Supp. 1987). See A. COHEN supra, at § 8.02.
103. For a discussion of lender liability as an operator, see supra notes 26-
45 and accompanying text.
104. For a discussion of steps that lenders can take to avoid superfund lia-'
bility, see infra note 113 and accompanying text.
105. Generally, this will be the case only if the owner/debtor is in some way
responsible for the contamination, and the contamination affects the collateral,
due to the fact that most lien provisions are only effective when the landowner is
a responsible party. For discussion of state lien provisions, see supra notes 46-
95.
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Provided that superfund liens are filed in a timely fashion,
creditors that lend money subsequent to a superfund incident
should have record notice of the pending liabilities. However, if
the superfund liens are not filed early in the response process,
lenders may be unaware of the potential liability of their
borrowers.
B. PROPERTY OWNERS
Property owners fall into several categories. Genuinely inno-
cent property owners may be shielded to a large extent when the
lien provisions are only applicable against a property when the
owner is a responsible party.' ° 6 Innocent landowners may be ad-
versely affected by the superfund liens where the lien provisions
apply regardless of owner responsibility 0 7
Situations where parties become owners as a result of a fore-
closure sale raise significant issues. Absent a statutory exclusion,
superfund liability attaches to lenders that foreclose on, success-
fully bid, and subsequently exercise control over contaminated
property or who fail to immediately dispose of such property. 0 8
However, without a superlien statute, the lender may elect not to
foreclose on the property until the government responds to the
contamination. The lender may then foreclose, purchase, and
dispose of the property in order to recover the value of the collat-
eral that has been restored and enhanced at the taxpayers
expense.
With a superlien, a lender will not benefit from the govern-
ment's response action because the government's lien will take
priority. One twist to this scenario could arise where the lender is
foreclosing and is completely exempt from liability and the super-
lien provision is operative only against property owned by re-
sponsible parties. In this case, a creditor that obtained title
through foreclosure would not be a responsible party and there-
fore any superfund type lien would not be effective. In states
where the liability of an innocent landowner is limited to the
value of the land, a foreclosing creditor would not be subject to
106. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-516 (Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 21E § 13 (West Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147B:10-b (Supp.
1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 lf.f (West Supp. 1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6020.509 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
107. Seee.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-
209 (Supp. 1989).
108. For a discussion of lender liability under Superfund, see supra notes
26-45 and accompanying text.
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liability for response costs but would be liable up to the value of
the land, even if the statute exempted creditors from direct
liability.
Responsible parties owning property subject to response ac-
tions will feel the effect of lien provisions due to the removal of a
potential source of security for funding business operations. It is
highly unlikely that potential lenders will want to step in line be-
hind a superfund lien.
The responsible owner may also be prevented from transfer-
ring the property. Under a superlien provision, the property
owner stands to have foreclosure proceedings initiated by the
state. With a simple lien the state cannot effectively force foreclo-
sure because any superior liens would not be displaced by the
foreclosure sale.' 0 9 Regardless of which lien is imposed and per-
fected, a subsequent purchaser would take subject to the lien. 1 °
C. STATE/DER/TAPAYER
A state's primary interest is the protection of the health and
safety of its citizens and environment. As the state proceeds to
effectuate response actions due to releases or potential releases of
hazardous substances, the state must also try to ensure the availa-
bility of financial resources for future projects. A superlien on
restored property would ensure that any benefits derived from
the expenditure of the state's funds would enure directly to the
state.
Most superliens will not accrue the benefits of the response
action directly to the state if the property is owned by a truly in-
nocent party. In this case it would be possible for an innocent
landowner to derive the benefits of the response action. If the
superfund statute exempts foreclosing lenders from liability, then
foreclosing lenders will also be able to benefit as innocent parties
from the response actions funded by the state. If, however, the
superlien is effective regardless of the responsibility of the owner,
the state can recover at least the value of the restored land by
virtue of the state's response action while still permitting inno-
cent parties (regardless of how title was obtained) to be exempt
from further liability.
109. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-504(4) ("When collateral is disposed of by a se-
cured party ... the disposition ... discharges the security interest under which it
is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto").
110. This illustrates the need for early filing of the lien in order to establish
a state's interests as well as to protect the interests of subsequent purchasers.
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IV. POLICY
While environmental laws pose potentially huge costs on
modem business,"' environmental cleanup imposes huge costs
on state and federal governments. Superlien statutes will force
borrowers and lenders to consider the possible impact of a haz-
ardous waste cleanup on a borrowers' ability to satisfy their obli-
gations, as well as the lenders' own potential liability for cleanup
costs. As virtually all supeffund statutes provide for an innocent
landowner defense, truly innocent parties will be protected from
liability.
This section will address the preventive measures that may
be taken by purchasers and lenders as well as the economic im-
pact on the affected parties.re2
A. PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Superlien statutes do not unreasonably increase the burden
on potential purchasers and lenders. In fact, superlien statutes
will force businesses to consider and plan for the potential re-
sponsibility to clean up hazardous waste. Purchasers of commer-
cial property cannot avoid performing some review of potential
sources of contamination or else they will be unable to establish
an innocent landowner defense to superfund liability. "s Lenders
I 11. See Cohen, Hazardous Waste: A Threat to the Lender's Environment, 19
U.C.C.LJ. 99 (1986).
112. Superlien provisions pose constitutional questions. The New Jersey
Supreme Court considered whether the imposition of a superlien is a taking of a
property interest without due process or just compensation, and whether it in-
terferes with contract rights. Kesslerv. Tarrats, 191 N.J. Super. 273, 466 A.2d 581
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1983), aff'd 194 NJ. Super. 136, 476 A.2d 326 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984).
The court held the New Jersey superlien provision to be a constitutional
exercise of the police power. Id. The court noted that mortgagees and owners of
property are subject to the state's police power. Id. at 294, 466 A.2d at 593-94.
Typically, a mortgagee insures that taxes and assessments are paid and that the
building is sufficiently maintained to avoid state ordered demolition. Id. Analo-
gously, the court reasoned that since the property at issue was destroyed by the
contamination, the statue did not "recklessly destroy a lien claim." Id. at 300,
466 A.2d at 59. Accordingly, in the face of a grave health problem, the statute
properly exercises the police power and does not effect a taking. Id. at 305, 466
A.2d at 600. Further, since the remedial action taken was necessary and re-
stored economic value to the property, the superlien provision did not impair
any contract right. Id. at 304, 466 A.2d at 596. The court also found that the
original security interest in the property was not destroyed when the fund was
given priority. Id. at 304-05, 466 A.2d at 600.
113. See, e.g., supra notes 28 (CERCLA) and 77 (state provision) and accom-
panying text.
25
Butterworth: State Superfund Superliens: Who Do They Lean On
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
188 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. I: p. 163
can also protect their interests by requiring prospective debtors
to undertake appropriate investigations.
Lenders may also require inclusion of provisions in lending
agreements to preclude or limit the handling of toxic chemicals
subsequent to the lending agreement."14
B. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A reasonable economic goal for an environmental statute
would be to "allocate rights and liabilities in such a way as to min-
imize the sum of the costs . . . of damage and of avoiding . . .
damage.""15 Superlien provisions help to allocate the costs of en-
vironmental decontamination among parties that are able to take
actions to insure that contamination does not occur, namely the
lending industry. 1 6 Environmental statutes must consider the
economic inefficiencies which result when costs are transferred
from the actual generators and disposers of hazardous waste sub-
stances to third parties. 1 7 Lenders are reasonably included as
responsible third parties because the money loaned helps to fi-
nance the activity that generated the hazardous substances.
The main burden of the simple lien provisions will fall on
unsecured lenders because prior secured lenders will usually be
in a position to recover the value of at least their collateral after a
response action. However, the unsecured lender is not in a
strong position to affect the behavior of parties responsible for
contamination. While the unsecured lender will also be affected
by the imposition of a superlien, this is more easily justified. All
lenders must assess the risks associated with any borrower. To
favor the secured lender over the unsecured lender, however,
would impose costs on a segment of society with little or no
power to effectuate any change in behavior.
1. Innocent Parties
No useful purpose can be served by imposing the burden of
environmental decontamination on innocent parties." 18 The be-
114. See Comment, Superfund Amendments of 1986, supra note 28 at 899.
115. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw (3rd ed. 1986).
116. The lending industry is in a good position to efficiently spread risk.
See Tom, supra note 44, at 932.
117. Ulen, Hester & Johnson, Minnesota's Environmental Response and Liability
Act: An Economic Justification, 15 ENV'rL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10109, 10111
(1986).
118. See generally Note, Hazardous Waste and the Innocent Purchaser, 28 U. FLA.
L. REV. 253 (1986).
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havior of innocent parties cannot be effectively altered by the im-
position of the expenses, because their behavior was not the
cause of the contamination. The question that needs to be re-
solved is, "who are the innocent parties?" It would seem that in-
nocent parties are those that cannot effectively modify their
behavior in a way to prevent or minimize environmental contami-
nation. Accordingly, in terms of ability to affect future behavior,
the lending industry may not be entirely innocent. In terms of
past behavior this is less clear.
Could or should banks have been aware of the actions of
their borrowers? It does seem that banks should be held partially
responsible for the actions of the parties that borrow money from
them. Banks must be interested in the business of their borrow-
ers in order to know whether they are of sufficient vitality to pro-
duce the funds for repayment of loans. It can be argued that
since banks lend funds for specific uses that they should be aware
of whether the funds are being used in an environmentally irre-
sponsible manner. Certainly, the potential for significant envi-
ronmental liability has been well known since the passage of the
Clean Air and Water Acts in the early nineteen seventies.
2. Prior Secured Creditors
The lending industry is structured to assess and evaluate
risks, both known and unknown. The potential for environmental
liability has been known for sometime. Although in many in-
stances the lender will not be directly responsible for contamina-
tion of the environment, some prior secured creditors stand to
receive a windfall if the property is cleaned up and they retain a
superior secured interest. Therefore, it does not seem unreason-
able to impose the costs of cleanup, at least to the extent of the
value of collateral that has been subject to cleanup, upon a se-
cured creditor.
State superfunds that impose superliens but do not impose
direct liability upon the lender, provide the government with
mechanism to recoup part of its costs from the lender (e.g. the
value of the property as enhanced by the remedial action) without
imposing liability on the lender for the entire cleanup as might
occur under CERCLA. 119 The superlien will limit the imposition
of costs on lenders to the amount of collateral that they have to
secure their loans, while CERCLA presents the possible imposi-
119. See supra notes 26 - 45.
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tion of the total costs of cleanup which may greatly exceed the
value of the collateral. Between superliens and complete liability,
the better policy seems to be the use of the superlien which pro-
tects lenders from complete responsibility for response costs,
rather than to impose the full cost of cleanup upon a lender
merely because it has foreclosed and exercised control over a
property in order to protect a security interest.'20
3. Responsible Parties
Responsible parties should be held responsible for the costs
of cleanup regardless of when the contamination occurs (e.g.
before or after the effective date of the statute). Imposition of a
superlien on the contaminated property is one effective way of
ensuring that the assets of the responsible party will be allocated
to replace cleanup costs.
In order for a responsible party to continue operation, the
party will have to pay the state the monies due or face foreclosure
on their property. The superlien statutes may well prove effective
merely by holding the party hostage. If the party refuses to pay
the state can foreclose on the property. This form of economic
"Sword of Damaclese" is not limited to the superlien statutes.
With a simple lien statute, the state, as a subordinate lien holder,
could still foreclose on the property thereby depriving the owner
of his interest in the property.' 2 '
4. Reduced Economic Growth Resulting from Increased Costs of
Capital
Some commentators have argued that imposition of the costs
of superfund liability will increase the cost of working capital and
result in recessionary economic effects.' 22 This argument seems
120. Of course, if a lender takes title to a property and fails to take appro-
priate action to prevent further environmental harm or even exacerbates the
problem it may be appropriate to hold the lender fully liable.
121. Foreclosure may be more complicated and would not necessarily net
the state that much money if prior, and hence superior, lienholders were in-
volved. However, the threat of foreclosure may scare the responsible party into
satisfying the superfund liabilities. It may also inspire the holder of the superior
lien to encourage the responsible party to comply, because of the possibility that
much less than the actual value may be realized in the foreclosure sale.
122. See Comment, Superfund Amendments of 1986, supra note 24 at 900. In a
recent article, Wendy Wagner analyzed empirical data from the U.S. Department
of Commerce on the number of real estate agents and managers, subdividers
and developers, mortgage bankers and brokers, business credit institutions, and
chemical industries in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. Wagner, Liabil-
ity for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of NewJersey's Approach, 13 HARV.
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to be somewhat exaggerated. The issue is how the economic bur-
den of cleanup should be allocated. Ultimately, the cost of
cleanup will be dispersed through various economic and legal de-
vices. The duties and possible costs imposed upon the lending
industry will ultimately be passed on to borrowers with the largest
fraction of the costs being levied primarily on the industries with
the highest risks of creating sites requiring remedial action. This
will happen because banks, as prudent lenders, will require that
borrowers pay for or perform the necessary environmental assess-
ments. Accordingly, the costs will be borne by the segment of the
economy responsible for the problem.
5. Internalize Costs as an Environmental Policy
Historically, environmental costs were external to the manu-
facturing process.' 23 Slowly, environmental statutes have shifted
these costs back to the manufacturer and ultimately to the con-
sumer of the products. The basic premise of an economic analy-
sis of hazardous waste disposal is that the improper disposal of
hazardous waste creates economic inefficiencies by imposing un-
compensated costs on society. 12 4 Public policy should strive to
minimize the costs on third parties by imposing those costs on the
parties that incur them.125
Lenders should also be required to shoulder part of the bur-
den of the increased manufacturing costs associated with environ-
mental protection. Lenders acquiring security interests
subsequent to the enactment of a superlien provision could
charge marginally higher interest rates, or higher origination fees
or force borrowers to perform appropriate investigations in order
to compensate for increased risks associated with the potential of
losses due to cleanup and subsequent superliens. While interests
ENVTL. L. REV. 245, 285-97 (1989). Wagner concludes that the data shows that
the strict environmental laws in New Jersey, including the superlien provision,
do not impact on the industries that were surveyed. Id. Ms. Wagner's analysis is
a commendable approach and may be a valid demonstration that environmental
laws do not seriously impact economic activity. It would be interesting to ana-
lyze data concerning interest rates in the state of New Jersey and neighboring
states, including if possible, a break down by industry. Such an endeavor is,
unfortunately, beyond the scope of this article.
123. See generally W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE (1979).
124. See Ulen, Hester & Johnson, supra note 117 at 10,111.
125. See id. See also W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 123. It should be
noted that an economic analysis can also be used to justify the imposition of
strict, joint and several liability for hazardous waste cleanup liability. See Ulen,
Hester & Johnson, supra note 117.
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perfected prior to the superlien statutes cannot provide for these
potential costs, there is little justification for letting the lender
benefit after the government has performed a cleanup of a con-
taminated property. If the owner of the property is an innocent
party, secured creditors of the innocent party will not be affected.
The question must be asked however, whether imposing a super-
lien works as an actual penalty even if the property is owned by an
innocent party. If the state did not clean up the contamination,
once discovered, the property would be of little or no value to
anyone, much less a secured creditor. Even if the secured credi-
tor foreclosed on the property, no recapture of the loan balance
would be possible through resale until the property was
decontaminated. 126
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Superlien provisions provide a reasonable means for states to
ensure that they recover their expenditures for cleanup costs.
The superliens should affect only the property that has been the
subject of the response actions. To include other property in the
superlien's scope would unfairly interfere with the interests of
other secured lenders with little or no control over the actions of
the borrower at some remote site. Additionally, the lien should
be imposed regardless of whether the property is owned by a re-
sponsible party.' 27 Protection for lenders 28 and for innocent
landowners can be achieved by limiting the repayment to the state
126. It should be noted that even if a party is innocent when contaminated
property is acquired, the innocent party status is lost if the party attempts to
transfer the property after contamination is discovered and does not inform a
purchase of environmental problems at the site. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (Supp.
1987); Tom, supra note 44, at 926 n. 16.
127. The legislative history of the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup
Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020.101-1305 (Purdon Supp. 1989) used the
analogy of the termite ridden building in a motion to include the superlien pro-
vision in the Pennsylvania Act. PA. SUPERFUND HANDBOOK, p. 162. A purchaser
whose property is destroyed by termites has recourse only against the seller.
The state has no duty to repair the property. Similarly, the owner of a contami-
nated property should not get the benefit of the state's cleaning the contamina-
tion without having to pay for the benefit. Despite the beauty of the logic, the
superlien was not adopted in Pennsylvania.
128. On April 4, 1990, Representative John LaFalce (D-NY) introduced a
new version of a bill submitted last year. The new legislation (HR 4494) broad-
ens the scope of protection of financial institutions to include public lenders,
such as the Small Business Administration, mortgage lenders, and charitable in-
stitutions. The prior bill (HR 2085) only referred to commercial lenders. HR
4494 further extends protection to corporate fiduciaries that hold legal trust to
property for purposes of administering a trust or estate.
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to the value that has been restored to the land by virtue of the
state's response actions.
Simple lien provisions should be included for all other prop-
erty of responsible parties. In this way, the state can ensure that,
in the event of bankruptcy, there is a reasonable chance of recov-
ering some of the response costs. Other secured creditors will
recover the value of their security interests before the govern-
ment, because of the infeasibility of requiring lenders to police
property in which the lender has no collateral interest. Lenders
can be secure in their security interests if they are willing to over-
see the security properties and take other necessary steps.
One essential ingredient of a useful lien provision is insuring
that the liens are recorded as early as possible. Ideally, the liens
should be recorded prior to the commencing of the cleanup. This
is certainly true for the superlien on the property subject to the
cleanup. 129 The danger with early filing for simple liens on other
property of potentially responsible parties is that the lien might
preclude that party from effectively carrying on business opera-
tions. On the other side, potentially responsible parties will be
precluded from disposing of assets during the course of the
cleanup but before the filing of the liens. Also weighing on the
side of the earliest possible filing is the interests of prospective
lenders and purchasers of property. Responsible agencies should
be given discretion to file the lien at early periods in the history of
a site. This way, agencies can use the threat of the lien provisions
as a tool in negotiating with responsible parties. As long as re-
sponsible parties can initiate cost recovery actions against other
responsible parties equity should be served.' 30
129. Obviously this could be carried to extremes greater than this author
envisions. Often, sites are listed on the EPA Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act List (CERCLIS) on a showing that haz-
ardous materials are handled at a site. After a site is listed on the CERCLIS it
may be as many as nine years before any site investigation occurs. Certainly, no
action should be taken in terms of filing a lien until a site is listed on the national
priorities list or the state equivalent or until money has been spent, whichever is
earlier.
130. Constitutional concerns may be raised by imposing liens on property
before adjudication of liability. However, in the few cases reviewing lien provi-
sions courts have weighed the states interest in remedying environmental con-
tamination heavily against the private interests at stake. See Kessler v. Tarrats,
supra note 113. Furthermore, levying prior to adjudication of liability is not a
novel concept. See, also, Reardon v. EPA, No. 89-2278-C (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 1990)
(1990 WL 15432). Reardon challenges the federal lien provision. While the
court notes that section 113 of CERCLA prohibits pre-enforcement judicial re-
view, the court rules that Congress cannot completely eliminate review of Con-
stitutional issues. The court holds that the Reardons are still free to use and
1990]
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VI. CONCLUSION
The state should not be an insurer for lenders or for inno-
cent parties. Without a superlien the state may well become the
insurer for innocent landowners. Furthermore, the absolute ex-
emption of owners that acquire title through foreclosure will also
make the state the insurer or guarantor of foreclosing lenders.
Free market forces will insure that the value of land reflects that
actual care that a landowner takes to insure that no environmental
contamination occurs. Taxpayer dollars need to be used for re-
sponse actions, but the benefit should not enure to private inter-
ests. Certainly private interests need to be protected. This
protection can be provided by ensuring that lien provisions re-
quire filing of the notice of the lien at the earliest possible
moment.
The lien provision does not add anything of true novelty to
the process of recovering expenses for environmental response
actions under superfunds. The true value of the lien provisions is
to ensure that the state response actions survive in bankruptcy.
Liens do seem to provide the state with a stream-lined means of
levying on and attaching the property of ajudgment debtor to the
state. If drafted correctly, the lien provisions permit the state to
attach a debtor's property before a judgment is rendered.
Superliens provide an effective mechanism for states to pro-
tect and reserve the funds collected in superfunds for the cleanup
of hazardous waste spills. Unlike simple lien provisions super-
liens provide incentives for secured lenders to take actions to in-
sure that spills and releases do not occur. While a burden may be
placed on lenders holding contaminated collateral, the burden
can be limited to the amount of the loan secured by liens on
properties subject to cleanup actions. Considering that, more
likely than not, the loaned money was used to finance the offend-
ing activities, the burden of the superlien seems to bear a fair re-
lation to the ability of lenders to take actions to minimize their
exposure to loss. In the same vein, the actions that lenders take
enjoy the property subject to the lien. Also, while the lien may make it more
difficult for the Reardons to sell the property for its full value, the Reardons are,
nonetheless, free to alienate the property. Accordingly, the court holds that the
filing of the lien does not deprive the Reardons of their property in violation of
the Due Process Clause.
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to protect themselves will also help to insure that future hazard-
ous waste spills will not occur.
David G. Butterworth
33
Butterworth: State Superfund Superliens: Who Do They Lean On
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
34
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol1/iss1/5
